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IDENTIFICATION
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Abstract: In a previous Philo article, it was shown how properties could be
ontologically dispensed with via a representational analysis: to be an X is to
comprehensively represent all the properties of an X. The current paper
extends that representationalist (RT) theory by explaining representation
itself in parallel epistemic rather than ontological terms. On this extended
RT (ERT) theory, representations of X, as well as the real X, both may be
identified as providing information about X, whether partial or comprehen-
sive. But that information does not match ontological, property-based
analyses of X, so it is epistemically fundamental—hence supporting a
broadly conceptualist rather than nominalist metaphysics.
In a previous Philo article, “A Representationalist Theory of Generality”
(hereafter “the RT article”),1 I showed how properties could be ontologically
dispensed with via use of representational concepts. The basic idea is that in
familiar cases of non-conventional representation, such as a picture A of
Napoleon, the picture A represents Napoleon in virtue of some of its proper-
ties representing some of Napoleon’s properties. But such an account has an
existentially quantified structure, suggesting that a universally quantified
version might also be of theoretical interest. I showed how such comprehensive
cases of representation—in which all of the properties of an item X represent
all of the properties of an X—could serve as an adequate nominalistic substi-
tute for properties as realistically conceived. Thus Napoleon, though a gen-
uine individual or particular, would not actually possess any properties, but
instead he would comprehensively represent all the properties of Napoleon.
It was also shown how the apparent references to properties in these
examples could be eliminated, in a world consisting of nothing but particu-
lars. In familiar non-comprehensive representational cases such as a picture
A of Napoleon, particular A represents the particular individual Napoleon.
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In comprehensive cases, an apparent case A of a real goat is a particular that
comprehensively represents a particular goat B—but there is no such par-
ticular goat B. Nevertheless, this does not prevent particular A from repre-
senting B, because it is a familiar fact about representations that there can
be representations of particular items which do not exist, such as a unicorn,
or Santa Claus.
Note that on this view of representation, it is always particulars that are
represented. Nevertheless, as in the example just given, the represented
particular need not exist. Thus two kinds of representation can be distin-
guished: familiar cases of external representation, in which one particular
represents another actual particular (a picture of Napoleon represents
Napoleon), and also cases of internal representation, in which the represen-
tational status of a particular is independent of whether or not it externally
represents a particular.2 An example is provided by pictures that represent
mythological scenery and people, which items have no independent exis-
tence as particulars.
Now in the resulting representationalist (RT) theory, the concept of rep-
resentation itself was taken as a primitive, and it was assumed to be an objec-
tive fact that certain objects or their parts are capable of representing other
objects and their supposed properties. It was also claimed that a person who
could learn to recognize which objects, or combinations of parts, represent
which other objects or represented properties, could then use the language
of properties—reinterpreted as a language about represented properties—
to identify the relevant objects and parts, just as well as could a language-user
in a world in which there were real properties and instances of them. The
current paper will concentrate on filling out this account of the objectivity
and cognitive utility of representational concepts. 
Nevertheless, whereas the previous RT paper presented an argument
for ontological nominalism, the current paper instead concentrates on pro-
viding a broadly conceptualist and epistemic account of representational
concepts themselves. Indeed, the papers are logically independent, in that
even if there are some genuine properties, the previously developed repre-
sentational concepts would still to be of significant value in understanding
cognitive processes of recognition, identification and classification. So
unqualified references to properties in the rest of the paper are either to
genuine properties, or to representational substitutes of some kind.
Also, as in the previous RT article, the somewhat unwieldy term “rep-
resentation” will be abbreviated, where appropriate, as “rep,” which may be
used in verb form (“A reps/is reping/repd B” for “A represents/is represent-
ing/represented B”) or noun form (“A is a rep of B” for “A is a representa-
tion of B,” or “a rep analysis” for “a representational analysis”).
1. ONTOLOGICAL IDENTITY VERSUS EPISTEMIC IDENTIFICATION
A useful initial way in which to distinguish ontological from epistemic issues
about representation is in terms of a contrast between the concepts of iden-
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tity and identification. The identity of an item is usually explained in terms of
its ontological constituents, such as a particular and various properties.
However, by contrast, identification of an item is typically an epistemic, cog-
nitive process that may or may not have ontological implications.
In what follows, as announced, I shall primarily explain representation
in epistemic rather than ontological or metaphysical terms. Thus, instead of
analyzing a particular object X in terms of its identity-criteria—as to those
properties the possession of which is necessary and sufficient for it to be X,
and so on—I shall instead focus on the identification-criteria for that object
X, that is, as to the conditions under which one could reasonably or justifi-
ably claim to have identified that object X, or its properties.
To begin, I shall argue that issues concerning conditions for successful
identification of an object X are in various significant ways distinct from
identity issues concerning X. For after all, we routinely identify all kinds of
things in terms of noticed characteristics that may have little to do with the
identity-conditions for those things.
For example, one might instantly identify a classic film on the basis of
viewing a few seconds of it, or establish which classical symphony one is lis-
tening to from a fragment of characteristic tonal and harmonic progression
heard from the second movement. But the establishment of such identifica-
tions hinges on characteristics which at most comprise only a small fraction
of the necessary conditions for the identity of the movie or symphony in
question, which certainly could not amount to logically sufficient identity-
conditions for them, and which also cannot be logically sufficient to distin-
guish the works one saw or heard from other works, which might also
include the same film sequence or musical sequence. Thus, in general, such
characteristic signs or identifying features, which epistemically justify to a
reasonably high degree the identification of something as being X, may have
only a peripheral or minor connection with X’s inherent nature and identity.
The distinctness of identification from identity-criteria becomes even more
striking if we consider identification cases in which primarily relational, rather
than inherent, properties of an object X are involved. For example, a not
uncommon plot idea in detective stories is that a kidnapped and blindfolded
victim might nevertheless be able to identify a specific bridge he was driven
over, by the sound the car made in crossing it—the recurrence of which sound
he may later use, after his release, to re-identify the bridge in question. But of
course, in thus identifying the bridge he is not identifying any inherent prop-
erty of it, but only making use of its relational property of causing both itself
and something else, namely a motor vehicle, to emit a characteristic pattern of
sound when the vehicle is driven over the bridge in question. Thus, the sound
is sufficient to identify the bridge, in spite of its not depending in any direct way
on the normal or inherent identity-criteria for the bridge.
In this example we see also a crucial factor pertaining to representation,
namely that the identification of the bridge via the sound is an indirect iden-
tification: the bridge itself is not identified by direct observation of it, but
instead the sound is identified as representing that particular bridge (rather
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than as representing some other bridge, or some other structure of the road
on which the car is being driven).
But exactly what is involved in this process of indirectly identifying the
referent or object of a rep? One critical element is a concurrent or prior
direct identification of the representational content of that sound, which is
what provides information sufficient to indirectly identify the referent.
Here is a brief explanation of the role of representational or informational
content in that process.
Using the “bridge sound” example again, if the sound is heard simply
as a sound, having its own characteristics, then an indirect identification of
its cause cannot even begin. It is only when the sound is regarded or per-
ceived as having some representational content, or subject matter—that is, as its
being indicative of, or as providing evidence of, or information about, its
cause—that one can attempt to identify which particular object might be the
one that the sound provides evidence about. Or, in slogan form, no repre-
sentation without content: that is, an object cannot rep or indicate or point
to some other object that is to be identified unless it is regarded as having
content, or meaning, or a subject matter.
Thus, the process of indirectly identifying the referent or object of a rep
involves the following elements. To begin with, clearly there is a semantic or
referential component involved, in that one’s identification of a represent-
ing object A as indirectly identifying X is analyzable as one’s identification of
the rep content of A as referring or pointing to X (rather than as pointing
to some other thing): that is what makes the identification of the relevant
object as X an indirect one. But at the same time this account presupposes
that one has, in so doing, directly identified something else, namely the rep
content (hereafter just: content) of A.3
This view of typical cases of rep as involving two integrally related kinds
of epistemic identification, one direct and the other indirect, can potentially
be generalized to apply to signs of every kind, whether natural or conven-
tional. (See section 8 for a discussion of linguistic signs.) To be a non-con-
ventional or natural sign of X, on this epistemic approach, is to be an object
(or event, etc.) that provides, in some specific natural or cultural context, a
reasonably justified indirect identification of the object X that it represents.
Then more culturally specific concepts of representation, such as that of pic-
torial rep or depiction, or of linguistic rep, can be specified—but which cat-
egories nevertheless are constructed using this same basic kind of analysis.
As an example of a natural sign, the characteristic sound made by the
interaction of a car with a bridge, when driven over a specific bridge X, is a
natural sign of that bridge X, and a suitably informed listener can hear that
sound as representing or signifying bridge X if she has learned to indirectly
identify the bridge in question simply on the basis of hearing the sound in
question as providing meaningful identifying information regarding the
bridge as part of its content. Thus, in sum, for suitably informed listener A,
sound B reps or signifies bridge X just in case A can indirectly identify or
recognize bridge X as a result of her perceptually grasping the relevant con-
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tent of sound B. Or in a pictorial case, a picture of an actual building is
directly identifiable as having that building as part of its content, which
enables one to indirectly identify the building itself.4
To summarize, this section has explored typical cases of using a rep to
achieve indirect identification of another item, in which perception of the
content of one item A is used as a means of indirectly identifying another
item B that is represented by A. For example, directly identifying a picture
as being a picture of Napoleon can enable a viewer to indirectly identify its
subject as being the actual person Napoleon.
2. VERIDICAL IDENTIFICATION DIFFICULTIES
Recall that the previous RT article explained the difference between a rep
of an X and a real X in broadly quantificational terms. Typical representa-
tional pictures are both partial—in that only some of their properties have a
rep function—and incomplete, in that they rep only some properties of a real
X. On the other hand, a supposedly real X was claimed to be a comprehen-
sive rep, in that all of its properties internally rep all of the properties of a
real X. In this manner the apparently absolute distinction between a rep of
an X and a real X could be dispensed with.
However, in the current, independent paper we are allowing the possi-
bility that there might be some genuine properties, and hence a legitimate
absolute distinction between reps of an X versus a real X in some cases. Also,
even if there were no properties, there would still remain a genuine dis-
tinction between comprehensive and non-comprehensive reps of an X.
But once cognitive or epistemic concepts such as recognition or identi-
fication are introduced into the discussion, the following kind of problem
arises. Normally concepts such as those of perception, recognition and iden-
tification are taken to be veridical concepts, in the sense that one cannot rec-
ognize or identify an item as being X, or an X, unless it is X or an X. But if
so, this would seem to preclude there being any genuine cases of recogni-
tion or identification of the contents of pictures or other non-comprehen-
sive reps with respect to the particular items that they externally represent.
For example, how could one genuinely recognize or identify Napoleon when
looking at a picture of him, in virtue of the Napoleon-related content of the
picture, since neither the picture itself, nor its content, is identical with the
individual externally repd by the picture, namely Napoleon?
Thus, the purely ontological, quantificational account of such reps in
the previous RT article does not by itself provide an explanation as to how
such apparent identifications could be genuine or legitimate, since as noted
above, the same problem would arise as a distinction between legitimate
identifications of comprehensive reps of a particular X as being X, versus
illegitimate identifications of non-comprehensive reps of X as being X.
Thus, the specific locus of the problem is cases of external rep in which one
particular reps another: since they are distinct particulars, how could one
correctly be identified as being the other?
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There are at least four dimensions of this problem, two of which have
been dealt with elsewhere and which hence will only be summarized here.
First, the epistemic considerations presented in section 1 above show that
central cases of the epistemic utility of external reps depend on directly iden-
tifying their content as a means to indirectly identifying the item that they
externally represent. Hence in such cases it is clear that two distinct con-
cepts of identification are at work, which are closely related to the distinc-
tion of internal from exernal rep.
As long as the distinct concepts of identification or recognition are not
confused, no inconsistency need result. In brief, the two concepts are linked
in the following manner: direct identification of the internally repd item X
is a necessary condition of one’s being able to indirectly identify the exter-
nally repd particular X. But direct identification of X itself either involves no
rep at all (if there are properties), or it is purely a matter of comprehensive
internal rep. The only problematic case is that in which one particular non-
comprehensively and externally reps another, but in that case the direct
versus indirect identification distinction resolves the apparent conflict.5
The second dimension of the problem is as follows. There is the closely
related issue of the distinction of a real from a merely representational X,
whether as an absolute ontological distinction, or as a comprehensive versus
non-comprehensive rep distinction. This problem can be handled by a
broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of rep, which distinguishes different
cognitive attitudes toward real versus merely representational cases of an X.6
As long as the attitudes are distinct, so that no cognitive confusions of
real with representational cases occur, then it is harmless to identify a rep of
X as being X. For example, one might be disposed to jump into a real swim-
ming pool, but not disposed to jump into a picture of that same swimming
pool, and hence one’s identification of each as being, or as having as its con-
tent, that same swimming pool is cognitively harmless, since no practical
confusion results. This solution to the real versus representational cases is
also fully consistent with the previous distinction of direct versus indirect
kinds of identification in the explanation of the first factor involved in the
problem, as discussed above.
However, two further dimensions of the original problem yet remain,
whose adequate resolution will occupy us for the remainder of this paper.
They are significant because the RT theory in the previous article does not
address them, while the solutions to the first two dimensions of the problem
summarized above are of only peripheral help. These two further dimen-
sions will be described in the next section.
3. TWO EXTRA IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS
By way of introduction to the first of our two remaining problems, consider
a series of increasingly detailed pictures of the English group of rocks or
stones making up the monument Stonehenge—from a rough sketch, pro-
viding only minimal information about the monument, to a high resolution
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color photograph of it, each from the same point of view. Each picture is
identifiable as being a picture of Stonehenge, and intuitively speaking, each
picture in the series provides increasing amounts of information about
Stonehenge, or reps more properties of Stonehenge.
However, though it is true that in some sense each picture reps more
properties of Stonehenge than do previous pictures in the series, neverthe-
less that atomistic way of describing the reps does not fully capture their
representational differences. For in identifying each picture as being a pic-
ture of Stonehenge, one does not merely identify the particular properties
of Stonehenge that each represents, but one also identifies each as reping
the particular item Stonehenge as having those various properties. Or, to put
the point in terms of the language of properties, each reps not only increas-
ing proportions of the properties of Stonehenge, but each also provides an
increasing amount of information about what it is to be Stonehenge; i.e., con-
cerning Stonehenge’s property of being Stonehenge.
Now the original RT theory would have explained such a series in
purely atomistic terms: each picture represented more properties of
Stonehenge, and that is all that there is to be said. But such an atomistic
account does not explain how the series of pictures may severally be identi-
fied as reping Stonehenge itself in increasing detail—that is, either the partic-
ular entity Stonehenge, or its property of being Stonehenge. Or, to put the
matter in terms of the language of information, each picture provides an
increasing amount of information about Stonehenge, but that information can-
not be atomistically decomposed without remainder into information about
particular properties of Stonehenge.
Because of the importance of the point, it will be further rephrased as
follows. A general theory about the rep of properties should not automati-
cally assume that all properties can be atomistically reduced to a few basic
kinds. Many properties associated with midsized objects, such as the prop-
erty of being the relevant kind of midsized object, seem to be holistic in the
sense that they cannot be reduced to, or eliminated in favor of, whatever
lower level properties are also possessed by the relevant objects. But if this
is so, then increasingly detailed reps of those mid-sized objects will typically
represent those holistic properties in increasing detail, as well as represent-
ing more of the relevant lower level properties. Yet so far we lack any theo-
retical apparatus to explain how a given property itself could be repd in dif-
ferent ways, such as in increasing detail.
Holistic considerations are thus relevant to identification of an X in reps
of an X in two different ways. First, the property of being a (whole) X is
involved, rather than just the individual properties that are possessed by
whole Xs. And second, each picture in the series provides increasing
amounts of information about that same whole item X, rather than just pro-
viding information about specific properties of the X.
The second of our two remaining problems involves an extra dimen-
sion of the identification problem just stated. In place of the original series
of increasingly detailed reps of Stonehenge, imagine instead another
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series, each of which provides roughly equivalent amounts of information
about Stonehenge—but with each being drawn, painted, photographed
etc. using different representational methods or different artistic styles. For
example, one might be a fully realistic but somewhat indefinite or blurred,
another might be in a vigorous impressionist style, but which conveys
roughly the same information as the indefinite realistic picture, and so on.
The problem now is that each picture has Stonehenge-related content that
is roughly equivalent in informational content, but each nevertheless still
represents Stonehenge in a different way than do the other pictures in the
series. Also, to emphasize, these different ways cannot be explained in
terms of representing different properties of Stonehenge, whether holistic
or lower level properties, just because of their rough equivalence in infor-
mational content.
It will turn out that the two problems are interconnected (see section 7)
but for the present we shall concentrate on discussing the implications of the
first problem, which could be called the varying information problem. One
major implication is that the previous RT method of elimination of properties
was too conservative, in that its one-to-one replacement of properties with repd
properties left the logical structure of the atomistic properties unchanged.
But the varying information problem shows that not only do holistic proper-
ties need to be provisionally considered—which were not considered in the
original RT analysis—but that a single property, even a holistic one, is too lack-
ing in structure to account for the varying information problem.
These two kinds of mismatch in logical structure—both of extra holistic
properties being provisionally required, and of their inadequacy in match-
ing the varying informational structure of representations of them—suggest
the following. Whether or not there are any properties of atomistic or holis-
tic kinds possessed by worldly items X, an adequate account of the rep con-
tent of reps of X must provide an independent account of the informational con-
tent of such reps.7 To the extent that the structures of such information match
those of putative properties, an RT-style elimination of those properties
could be provided. But in the case of any mismatches, it is necessary to rec-
ognize the epistemic autonomy of such informational concepts from ontological
property concepts. There must be legitimate roles played by the information
in rep contents in a cognitive system, which roles cannot be reduced to the
role of those contents in being about supposed worldly properties.
4. INFORMATION ABOUT AN X
In more detail, the suggestion is that a concept of information about an X
needs to be introduced. Real Xs (if any) supply comprehensive information
about an X, whereas reps of an X provide only partial or non-comprehen-
sive information about an X. But cases of both kinds can be legitimately
identified as providing some information about an X, and hence as being
veridical identifications, as long as the information provided is correct.
(Thus, to this extent, an informational approach provides another way to
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solve or dissolve concerns about veridical identification of non-comprehen-
sive reps, as discussed in section 2).
Hence both reps of an X, and X itself, may be regarded as falling on a
single epistemic identificatory scale, of items that are, in a suitably broad sense,
identifiable as X—which scale at the top, comprehensive end includes a real
X, since that X itself may be identified as X. So, from the epistemic point of
view of cognitive processing of information, a real X and reps of X could be
regarded as being on a par: all of them are grist for the same internal cog-
nitive identifying mechanisms with respect to processing varying amounts
of information about that X.
But what kind of identificatory scale is involved here? Intuitively, it
seems correct to describe the limiting case, as above, as one of comprehensive
identification. Thus in the limiting case the concepts of comprehensive identi-
fication of an X, and of the identity of an X, apparently could be regarded as
providing roughly equivalent epistemic versus ontological ways of describ-
ing the same facts about X—namely, identifying all of the information about
an X, and specifying all of the properties of that same X (though see the next
section for a caveat).
However, this does not mean that the non-comprehensive representa-
tional cases permit any such equivalence, for as argued in section 3 using
the Stonehenge example, information about an item X is holistic in ways in
which properties—or their representational substitutes as provided by the
RT theory—are not. In view of this fact, a useful theoretical move at this
stage is as follows. Since each picture in the series provides, in virtue of its
X-related representational content, increasing amounts of information
about X, and since that information is also what enable a viewer of the pic-
ture to recognize or identify the picture as being a picture of X, we may pos-
tulate that the representational content of each picture of X consists of some
X-related informational structures (ISs), perception of which prompts identifi-
cation of the picture as a picture of X.8
The relevant ISs might be holistic or relational in several ways. For
example, to cite a new kind of case, the shape Si of one particular stone in
Stonehenge would be repd in a picture P in virtue of P’s representational
content containing an IS IS(Si), which may provide information not only
about the shape Si, but also comparative information about the relative size
of the stone having that shape Si in relation to the shapes of the other
stones, how that stone relates to the monument as a whole, and so on.
To be sure, a perceiver of picture P may or may not, in identifying the
shape of that particular stone in the picture, cognitively extract all of the
information available in structure IS(Si), but pictures and other reps only
count as reps at all in virtue of their being capable of supplying such infor-
mation about a worldly item X and its parts to perceivers of them. Indeed,
this guaranteed epistemic accessibility of any informational structure con-
trasts with the merely contingent accessibility of an ontological property,
whose instantiation by an item may or may not be discoverable by us.
To summarize, the main differences of informational structures (ISs)
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from properties uncovered so far are as follows. Either there are many dif-
ferent X-related holistic IS types, one for each of the types of reps involving
different amounts of information about X, or the identity of a single X-
related holistic IS persists through changes in the amount of information
provided by the structure. For example, the many ISs, or single changing
IS, corresponding to the property of being Stonehenge is part of the con-
tent of various reps of Stonehenge, some of which provide more informa-
tion about Stonehenge than others. Whereas by contrast, presumably there
is only a single, immutable property of being Stonehenge as viewed at a par-
ticular time from a particular position, or a single perspectival state of the
object, so that the single property or object state does not match either con-
ception of the relevant informational structure(s).
As to which conception of holistic X-related ISs is correct, a plausible
view is that both are legitimate, each serving differing cognitive purposes. As
pointed out by Millikan,9 there is a “consumer” aspect to representational
content, such that what the content of a rep counts as being depends on the
cognitive use to which that representation is put. When the cognitive
emphasis is on its being the same whole object or property that the content
is about, the identity-through-change conception is appropriate. But when
instead the emphasis is on the differing amounts of information, the multi-
ple IS conception is more appropriate. Or alternatively, a genus-species
conception of their relations could be adopted: information about a partic-
ular object X is the genus, and each specific level of information about X is
a species of that same genus. On that alternative conception, the interest-
relativity of content would be a matter of cognitive interest in the genus
rather than the species, or vice-versa.
5. A BROADER ISSUE: GENERALITY VERSUS PARTICULARITY
At this point, it is appropriate to raise a broader issue. The original RT the-
ory explained the generality of properties, for example sortal properties, in
terms of each individual X of the relevant kind Y comprehensively repre-
senting a Y. It also explained the numerical distinctness of particular Xs of
kind Y in terms of each comprehensively representing a numerically distinct particu-
lar Y. However, it might be thought that this account does not fully explain
the concept of what it is to be a particular object or individual X, for partic-
ular objects can be classified in indefinitely many ways, so that even com-
prehensive representation by an individual X of some particular of kind Y
might be thought to underdetermine the particularity or identity of that object
X. (There are also essentialist issues, of the kind raised by Quine,10 as to
whether explaining the individuality of X in terms of its being a Y invidi-
ously classifies it as essentially a Y but not essentially a Z, for some other sor-
tal Z that also classifies X). Or, to put the issue in terms of properties, the RT
account might seem not to adequately address the issue of X’s property of
being that particular individual X,11 independently of ways in which it might
be classified. So, either the brute particularity of X isn’t fully explained, or
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in terms of the language of properties, X’s property of being that particular
object X isn’t fully explained.
Now to be fair to the RT theory, it does have at least a partial answer to
these accusations. First, as to brute particularity, if there are no properties
then the difference of one particular from another can be taken as being
primitive. Second, since the RT view explains what it is for a particular X to
be a real Y in terms of comprehensive rep of all of the properties of a Y, then
all possible classifications of the particular X are automatically included in
this account. Nevertheless it remains true that the issue of the status of X’s
putative uniquely particularizing property of being that particular individual
X—or of representational substitutes for it—is not specifically addressed by
the RT account.
But now, with the aid of the current epistemic informational approach,
that issue can be addressed. The concept initially developed in the previous
section of all of the information about a particular individual X, such that X itself
comprehensively reps all of that information, while other reps of X non-
comprehensively rep some of that information about X, does not depend on
an analysis specifically couched in terms of a particular property-related
sortal term. Thus, the current account is doubly immune to the accusation
that the particularity of X is slighted, as possibly it was to some extent in the
original RT analysis. It is immune, first because no particular sortal is
invoked in the current analysis, and second, because the issue about the
particularity of X itself is fully addressed, in that information about X itself,
or its holistic property of being that particular individual X, is specifically
recognized as being distinct from information about other properties of X.
Now if we considered only X’s own comprehensive internal rep of all of
the information about itself, the claim that the information includes infor-
mation about its holistic particularizing property of being X might seem to
be a mere stipulation or trick. But what gives legitimacy to that analysis is
the fact that clearly there can be many non-comprehensive external reps of
X, which include information uniquely or holistically about X itself, and yet
which do so in various different, informationally non-equivalent ways. Or in
other words, our legitimate cognitive need to fully grasp the particularity of
an object X shows itself in the fact of our having potentially many different
reps of that unique particularity of X, each of which supplies in its own way
different amounts (and possibly different kinds) of information about what
it is to be that particular item X.
This point remains valid even if there are properties, and even if some
form of the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles is true for
some particulars (whose truth normally would be assumed to be incompat-
ible with a particular having a thisness). The particular would still remain
more than the properties it instantiates, because it would still comprehen-
sively rep all of the information about itself,12 including holistic information
about what it is for it to be that particular, and also non-comprehensive reps
of that particular would continue to be relevant as discussed above.
The current analysis is also important for a broader metaphysical rea-
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son. It might be thought that the universal/particular distinction is a meta-
physically unavoidable one, so that any attempt to eliminate universals in
favor of particulars, as the RT theory attempted to do, is bound to end in
failure.13 However, the current informational analysis of particularity shows
that a form of the universal/particular distinction lives on in representa-
tional form, in that turns out that a full cognitive understanding of what it
is to be a unique particular—even in a world where there were no proper-
ties or universals—could be achieved via the possibility of a multiplicity of
distinct reps of that same individual. Thus, in this manner the concepts of
universal and particular would remain as irreplaceable correlatives, even if
universals were ontologically eliminated.
6. THE INDEPENDENCE OF INFORMATIONAL FROM PROPERTY CONCEPTS
The position we have arrived at so far is a broadly conceptualist one. The
original RT article eliminated properties of particular objects X via an analy-
sis in terms of their comprehensive internal rep of an X. In this paper the
related concept of non-comprehensive external rep is being explained in
broadly epistemic, informational terms, via an analysis of the cognitive
processes involved in identification of the representational content of pub-
lic representations, such as pictures, of particular worldly items X. A crucial
point has been the provision of evidence that holistic informational content
about a particular item X cannot be explained in terms of a property of X,
even of the special “thisness” kind, such as X’s putative property of being
that particular object X. Nor could the brute fact of the unique objecthood
of X, divorced from property considerations, explain the possibility of vary-
ing kinds of holistic information about X occurring in reps of X providing
different amounts of information about X.
Further evidence along the same lines will now be provided. To begin,
it might be thought that X’s “thisness” property, of X being the particular
object that it is, is a special case, which could be bracketed, or otherwise
worked around, so as to restore the simpler RT account of rep content.
However, this is not so, for structurally the same informational points would
apply to any non-minimal visible part of X as well. For example, each of the
stones making up Stonehenge is such that it has the holistic property of
being that particular stone, but each stone is equally representable in dif-
ferent informational ways, just as Stonehenge itself is. And the same goes for
all of the non-minimal visible parts of the stones, that is, those parts,
whether separable or inseparable, which can be seen to have parts them-
selves. All of them have the holistic property of being that particular chunk
of matter—whether or not considered as being part of Stonehenge—which
property is irreducible to the properties of their own parts, and all of them
are representable in different informational ways.
A clinching point can also be provided, which is independent of holistic
considerations. Certain kinds of reps, such as uniformly blurred ones, are
such that all of the properties of X, whether holistic or not, are represented
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in informationally indeterminate ways, which hence differ from how non-
blurry reps would rep all of those properties. So, informationally varied
ways of reping any and all properties of any particular item X must be ubiq-
uitous in possible reps of X.
Now at this point, some care is needed. We still wish to preserve the
legitimate sense in which non-conventional reps of some object X, such as
pictures of X, do indeed veridically externally rep X and its properties,
whatever may be the correct metaphysical account of objects and proper-
ties. For it is generally assumed that at least some reps of worldly particu-
lars X are veridical or correct. But at the same time, we also wish to accu-
rately describe and explain the cognitive facts about the noted mismatches
between the varying kinds of information provided by reps of an X, and the
properties of the X itself, however those properties are construed. What is
needed is a broader theory of representation that can restore consistency to
these apparently conflicting considerations. One such theory will now be
outlined, in this and the following section.
To begin, consider again a uniformly blurred rep A of some object such
as Stonehenge, such as an out-of-focus photograph of it. Now on a simplistic
resemblance theory of representation, since all of picture A’s X-related con-
tent is blurred, but no part or property of Stonehenge is blurred, then A com-
pletely fails to rep Stonehenge or any of its properties. Hence, A could not be,
or be legitimately identified as, a veridical or correct rep of Stonehenge.
However, clearly such a simplistic resemblance theory is totally inade-
quate.14 Though blurred picture A does not provide fully detailed informa-
tion about Stonehenge, it does provide some information about it, which
information is correct as far as it goes. For example, the rough configuration
or arrangement of the stones, as repd in picture A, is indeed roughly as A
reps it to be. So, A does not supply any misleading information about the con-
figuration of stones in Stonehenge, and so to that extent A does veridically
represent Stonehenge and some of its properties.
Nevertheless, since the actual stones in Stonehenge are usually assumed
to be in a precise rather than a rough configuration, the rough configura-
tion repd by picture A is not an actual relational property of Stonehenge.
Approximately correct rep of properties of X is not correct rep of approxi-
mate properties of X, because there could not be any approximate proper-
ties of anything. So, the mismatch between informational content and prop-
erties of X persists—and of course, any rep Y of an actual object X, other
than an exact replica of X, would be blurred or indeterminate in its content
at some microscope level of detail. So, the problem remains a pervasive one
for reps in general.15
In schematic form, my initial suggested resolution of the problem is as
follows. The previous RT theory showed how to ontologically eliminate
properties. This paper is engaged in showing, in effect, that cognitive uses
of public, non-comprehensive external reps, which are fundamental and
pervasive in perception and cognition, are to be understood in terms of sui
generis informational concepts, which only loosely correspond to traditional
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realist conceptions of the actual properties of objects, whether or not there
are any such properties.
As a consequence, one natural initial view is that a concept of a veridical
non-conventional rep of X needs to be reinterpreted as a concept of a non-
misleading rep of X, that is, one such that the specific level of information about
X that it provides is not misleading in relation to typical cognitive uses that
would be made of that information in studying X, or in interacting with it. For
example, a bank photograph of a suspect committing a crime might be accu-
rate enough to enable the actual perpetrator P to be identified on the basis of
it. In such a case, not only does the photograph rep person P in virtue of his
causal link to the photograph, but it also non-misleadingly reps P in virtue of its
facilitating correct identification of P by the police. On the current view, there
might be no more to its usually assumed “veridical” status than that.
An important issue arising from this view is of the relation of such
broadly pictorial kinds of veridical rep to conventional linguistic reps that
express propositions. A central concern could be expressed as follows. If
veridicality for pictures is non-misleadingness, rather than correspondence
to the properties (or representationally eliminated properties) possessed by
objects, would a similar non-correspondence analysis of propositional truth
also be required, or do linguistic reps work in fundamentally different
ways? At this stage both options are open, because nothing previously said
in this paper has directly addressed relevant issues such as that of the truth-
conditional propositional content of beliefs.
It is true that there are some significant differences between linguistic
and pictorial reps, e.g. of the kinds recently described by Cummins and
Poirier.16 Also, the current skepticism, both about the ontological reality of
properties and about the cognitive utility of exclusively property-based con-
cepts, does not imply skepticism about the reality of a mind-independent
world of particulars, and so something like a traditional correspondence
theory of truth would still seem to be appropriate. Both of these points
would support a bifurcated view that would treat pictorial and linguistic
reps separately. Nevertheless, section 8 will provisionally suggest a way of
maintaining worldly correspondence for both kinds of reps, so that a com-
mon treatment for both kinds may still be possible.
7. TWO KINDS OF REPRESENTATION
This section continues the presentation of a more comprehensive theory of
representation which can explain how there can both be correct reps of an
object X and its apparent properties, yet which reps also provide distinc-
tively different amounts of information about object X, in ways that in no
case precisely match X’s apparent properties. It has already been explained,
in outline form, how veridicality for such reps of X could initially be re-con-
ceptualized in terms of the cognitive non-misleadingness of information pro-
vided by such reps, rather than in terms of each rep having properties that
match properties of X.
But it still remains to provide an improved theory of rep that goes
beyond the simplistic resemblance view rejected in the previous section.
Recall that on such a resemblance view, since all of a blurred picture A’s X-
related content is blurred, but no part or property of Stonehenge is
blurred, then A completely fails to rep Stonehenge or any of its properties.
As also pointed out, a more adequate theory should explain how A can pro-
vide some information about X without its having to be completely specific
information about X.
A key to providing a more adequate theory is as follows. In some way
the blurred or soft-focus aspects of the rep A of X need to be conceptually sep-
arated from the non-specific information about X provided by A. The
blurred appearance of each area of picture A does not itself have a role in
representing information about X. Instead, it is a broadly contextual or aspec-
tual feature of picture A that is independent of A’s X-related content, since
reps of any items whatsoever could have a blurred appearance.
At this point it is now possible to re-introduce the second problem from
section 3, namely that even reps of X which are approximately equivalent in
amounts of X-related content may nevertheless diverge widely in stylistic
features, including the medium used (e.g., drawing, painting, photography)
plus whether the artist employed impressionist, expressionist, realistic etc.
styles in presenting the X-related information. Both the main amounts-of-
information problem and this broader stylistic problem may be resolved by
distinguishing broadly contextual aspects of representations A, which are
independent of the world-related content of A, from the worldly-content-
related aspects of A, which are independent of the style. (Artistic style is one
species of contextual or aspectual information about a rep).
A simple perceptual analogy can help to clarify the distinction. In misty
conditions, a familiar object such as a house X can look hazy or blurred
because of the mist. But since this is perception of a real house X, it is taken
for granted that the blurred appearance of the house does not imply that
viewers of the house are seeing a blurred house. Instead, though the misty
conditions contextually reduce the amount of house-related information
about X available to perceivers of it, perceivers automatically compensate
for the misty conditions by cognitively distinguishing the mist-related infor-
mation from the house-related perceptual information about X. My claim is
that the same, or closely similar, cognitive mechanisms are at work in per-
ception of reps of an X as well. In both real and representational cases, two
levels or kinds of perceptual representation are involved, with two distinct
kinds of content corresponding to the distinction between contextual or
aspectual factors versus object-related factors.17
Parenthetically, this “double content” kind of representational theory
can also provide a convincing account of the nature of photographs and
other visual artworks. Such artworks are the stylistic content represented by
physical artifacts such as copies of a photograph, and that stylistic content
in turn has a world-related content in virtue of its representing some
worldly subject matter.18
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We can now resolve our problem as to how widely different kinds of
reps of an item X, such as Stonehenge, involving different kinds of aspec-
tual or stylistic content and providing different amounts of information
about Stonehenge, can nevertheless all be providing holistic information
about Stonehenge itself. It is possible because perception of objects X in gen-
eral involves two levels of representation or content, so that perception of
reps of a particular object X re-uses the same two-level representational
mechanisms to separate out the aspectual from the object-related content.
However, this process is inevitably a holistic one, in that the original low
level perceptual data, e.g., as acquired via perception in misty conditions,
involves a thoroughly intermixed form of mist-related and object-related
data. So, the cognitive separation of the components is an approximate,
epistemically imperfect process that can provide no more than incomplete
holistic information about the relevant worldly item X. That, in a nutshell, is
the reason why there must be a mismatch between the ontological cate-
gories of objects and properties on the one hand, and epistemic categories
associated with representational perceptual information on the other hand.
Nevertheless, the close association between cases of normal perception
of non-representational objects, and perception of reps of other objects,
ensures that the objectivity of normal perception also carries over to percep-
tion of reps. Though holistically informational, reps of items X represent
the relevant items X just as objectively as normal perception reps its objects.
(Which is not to deny that misrepresentations can occur in both cases).19
Hence we have, at least in outline form, achieved our primary goal of
explaining representation in broadly epistemic, informational terms, while
also preserving the objectivity of rep, and its close connection with epistemic
processes of identification of items, whether in real or rep cases. The cur-
rent double content account of rep is also fully consistent with the previous
RT article, as well as improving on its results in various ways. (The result-
ing joint theory may be described as the Extended RT or ERT theory).
8. KINDS OF CORRESPONDENCE, AND LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATIONS
This section is more speculative and open-ended than the previous discus-
sions, but the paper would be incomplete without it. To begin, recall that in
section 6 an initial view was presented, according to which the veridicality of
pictures and other non-conventional reps is to be explained in terms of their
providing non-misleading information about an object X, rather than in terms
of their correspondence to the properties of X—since they fail to match, or
correspond to, the properties of X. However, that initial view could simply be
the result of a too limited or too conservative view about objects and prop-
erties. For even if there are properties of X to which reps of X fail to corre-
spond, it must not be forgotten that, according to the present theory, object
X itself comprehensively reps all of the information about X.
So, veridicality for reps of X might instead be explained in terms of
informational correspondence, or informational inclusion, as follows. A rep A of
X is informationally veridical just in case all of the information it provides
about X is included in the information that X comprehensively provides
about itself to perceivers of it. Nevertheless, so far there is nothing to pre-
vent us from maintaining both kinds of veridicality simultaneously. With
respect to the properties of X, if there are any, property-based veridical rep of
X’s actual properties is non-misleading rep of them, whereas with respect to
the information about X provided by reps of X, veridical rep of X is infor-
mational correspondence. Nevertheless, for any particular X that has no
genuine properties, then informational correspondence for reps of it would
be the only applicable veridicality relation.
As for the previous project of the RT article in eliminating properties,
now two distinct kinds of elimination may be distinguished. Conforming
eliminations of a property F, if any, would be those in which the compre-
hensive representation by object X of an object having property F is such
that part of the comprehensive information provided by X conforms to our
pre-theoretical concept or understanding of the relevant property. (The RT
article only dealt with such conforming eliminations). Non-conforming elimi-
nations, if any, would be those for which no such conforming relation holds.
(Example: if an exact property were eliminated in favor of some inexact
information, then that would be a non-conforming elimination).
Now the issue of conventional linguistic representations will be dis-
cussed. The upshot of the discussion above for non-conventional reps such
as pictures is that an informationally based correspondence relation is avail-
able, whether or not there are any genuine properties, and whether or not
any property eliminations are conforming. Also, even if there are some gen-
uine properties—veridical rep of which requires provision of non-mislead-
ing information about them—there is no prima facie reason why conven-
tional linguistic reps should not provide such information just as well as
non-conventional reps. So, there are no initial roadblocks in the way of
extending the results of the present paper to apply to linguistic reps also.
Here are three further arguments in favor of such an extension. First,
both normal perception of a worldly item X, and pictures of X, provide only
inexact information about X. But then one would expect that linguistic reps
of X would similarly only provide inexact information about X. So, prima
facie, the same veridicality issues discussed for pictures etc. should also
apply to issues concerning the truth of propositions expressed by such lin-
guistic reps of X. Second, in spite of the significant differences between pic-
tures and linguistic sentences (see the end of section 6), it is generally pos-
sible to linguistically describe the informational content of a picture to any
desired level of detail. Also, these descriptions could include descriptions of
the inexact information provided by the picture about X. But presumably
those descriptions have as their content some subset of the same inexact
content as the pictorial content that they describe. So again, similar corre-
spondence structures should apply to both pictorial and linguistic descrip-
tion. And third, Millikan20 provides much evidence that identification of
items through perception of language about them works in much the same
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way as perception of the items themselves, hence demonstrating a structure
parallel to that shown here for perception of pictorial reps of an X versus
perception of X itself.
9. BROADER HORIZONS
The discussion in this paper will now briefly be situated in a broader con-
text. There are perennial issues raised in the realism versus antirealism
debates21 about how our representations of the world relate to the world
itself. Realists claim that we are able to mentally represent a mind-indepen-
dent reality, whereas antirealists deny this, via such methods as attempting
to undermine the representationalist structures assumed by the realist. The
current paper could be viewed as arguing for an intermediate position in
that debate. Though it assumes, with the realist, that worldly particulars
exist independently of our representational cognition of them, nevertheless
the concept of informational content developed here is a concept that is
both mind-dependent and world-dependent. Whereas the previous RT
article rejected properties on thoroughly realist ontological grounds, the
current paper argues that the representationalist replacement for any such
rejected properties, namely information about the world, must be under-
stood in fundamentally epistemic rather than ontological ways.
Or, using as an analogy the hypothesized observation-dependence of
quantum-mechanical phenomena on observers of them,22 the current paper
in effect argues that we cannot separate objective information about the
world—which we identify via use of perceptual, pictorial or linguistic repre-
sentations—from our own epistemic activities of perceptually identifying and
representing that information. On the account given here, information is
not—as it is in the “informational semantics” of Dretske, Fodor et al23—simply
an instrumental way to learn about the actual, mind-independent properties
of worldly items. Instead, information is, at the most fundamental level, a
joint product of the world and our epistemic interactions with the world.
Nevertheless, the current view remains a moderate or hybrid one in
another respect. It has not been denied that there may be some objective,
mind-independent properties conforming to the traditional realist under-
standing of them. Instead it has been argued that if there are any such, a cor-
respondence theory of truth for references to such entities must adjust itself
to the informational realities of our epistemic situation via a concept of cor-
respondence as provision of non-misleading information about such entities.
(Thus we could both have our realist cake, and eat it informationally too).
As for how the current epistemic view relates to strong realist views such
as physicalism, a natural employment of the current hybrid view of proper-
ties in support of a physicalist ontology would be as follows. The fundamen-
tal particles etc. and their properties, as postulated by our best science, may
actually exist (subject to revisions by ongoing science), but the supposed
macroscopic properties of midsized objects may be eliminated using the rep-
resentational methods developed in the current extended RT (ERT) theory.
 
An advantage of such a physicalism-friendly, two-tier picture of reality
is that it would sidestep, for midsized objects, the apparently intractable
conflicts between realism and antirealism with respect to them. For the rep-
resentational elimination of their properties would remain compatible with
a robust realism about the underlying physical reality, hence giving both
realists and antirealists some of what each wants.
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